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INTRODUCTION 
The Louisiana Mineral Code has much to offer common law jurisdictions 
that seek to more completely define the oil and gas property interest. As 
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common law courts grapple with cross-boundary intra-reservoir conflicts, 
such as hydraulic fracturing (“frac”) fissures that cross subterranean 
property lines, the Louisiana Civil Code provides useful guidance on how 
to be “neighborly”1 while the Mineral Code reminds us that reservoir 
rights are “correlative.”2 These Code provisions provide accurate and 
useful reminders about the scope of “ownership” within an oil and gas 
reservoir.3 As is often the case, the Code provisions also provide guidance 
for how common law jurisdictions might better address oil and gas issues.4 
In typical elegant fashion, the Mineral Code states: “Landowners and 
others with rights in a common reservoir or deposit of minerals have 
correlative rights and duties with respect to one another in the development 
and production of the common source of minerals.”5 In the past, most of the 
focus has been on “rights and duties” that place limitations on what an owner 
can do within the reservoir: negative rights.6 This Article explores the 
                                                                                                             
 1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 (2015) (“Although a proprietor may do with his 
estate whatever he pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive 
his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any 
damage to him.”); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:10 & cmt (2000) 
(describing Article 10 as “a limited restatement of the obligation of good 
neighborhood contained in Article 667 of Louisiana Civil Code”). Article 2 of the 
Mineral Code explains the relationship between the Mineral Code and the Civil 
Code by providing that in the event of a conflict regarding a mineral law issue the 
Mineral Code “shall prevail.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2. Otherwise, the 
Mineral Code is “supplementary” to the Civil Code. Id. 
 2. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:9. 
 3. As used in this Article, the term “reservoir” has the same meaning as the 
term “pool” that Louisiana law defines as “an underground reservoir containing a 
common accumulation of crude petroleum oil or natural gas or both.” LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:3(6) (2007); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213(3) (2000) 
(adopting same definition). 
 4. The best examples of common law states seeking to mimic Louisiana law 
to address nagging oil and gas problems are the “Dormant Mineral” and “Mineral 
Lapse” acts designed to impose a “use” requirement to perpetuate a severed 
mineral interest beyond a stated statutory period. See generally Texaco, Inc. v. 
Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (upholding the Indiana dormant mineral act designed 
to terminate a “mineral interest” if not “used” for 20 years and the owner fails to 
file a statement of claim); Scully v. Overall, 840 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1992) (distinguishing terms of the Kansas mineral lapse act from the Indiana act). 
Title examiners across the nation are envious of Louisiana’s mineral servitude 
doctrine that avoids the myriad perpetual estates in minerals that exist under the 
common law system. 
 5. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:9 (emphasis added). 
 6. See, e.g., Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1948) 
(negligent operations resulting in blowout and damage to the reservoir). This 
concept is articulated in Article 10 of the Mineral Code: “A person with rights in 
a common reservoir or deposit of minerals may not make works, operate, or 
otherwise use his rights so as to deprive another intentionally or negligently of the 
liberty of enjoying his rights, or that may intentionally or negligently cause 




positive rights aspects of correlative rights and how such an analysis can 
assist in resolving intra-reservoir conflicts. Development of a coherent 
analysis of correlative “rights and duties” in the oil and gas reservoir has 
been stunted by the ad coelum doctrine and the rule of capture. 
The quest for a more complete definition of property in oil and gas 
begins with the foundational concepts created by the ad coelum doctrine 
and the rule of capture, followed by qualifying principles created by 
correlative rights and conservation regulation. The contours of correlative 
rights are explored in the context of subsurface boundary disputes that 
require a precise delineation of rights in oil and gas reservoirs lacking 
physical boundaries. The study is completed with the author’s “reservoir 
community” analysis that defines and marshals each owner’s positive and 
negative correlative rights in a reservoir. 
I. THE AD COELUM DOCTRINE 
Much of the law of real property depends upon boundary lines drawn 
upon the surface of land. Boundaries define “ownership” and the unlawful 
invasion of ownership: “trespass.”7 The “ad coelum doctrine” is the 
abbreviated term used to describe the extent of ownership in land within 
surface boundaries.8 Ownership extends above and below the land 
surface.9 The ad coelum doctrine is a foundation of land law everywhere 
in the United States.10 For example, the civil law statement of the doctrine 
is contained in Louisiana Civil Code article 490:  
                                                                                                             
damage to him.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:10; see also Mobil Exploration & 
Producing U.S. Inc. v. Certain Underwriters Subscribing to Cover Note 95-
3317(A), 837 So. 2d 11, 36 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (applying Article 10 and the 
comments to negligent drilling operations that resulted in a blowout and loss of 
“an ownership interest in hydrocarbons to be produced from the property at 
issue”).  
 7. Boundaries also play a similar role in defining the unlawful interference 
with ownership: “nuisance.” 
 8. The complete maxim is: cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad 
inferos, which is translated: “To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the 
sky and to the depths.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (5th ed. 1979). 
 9. See supra note 8. 
 10. The ad coelum doctrine has been adopted, either by common law or by 
statute, to draw the necessary subsurface boundary lines. For example, the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas adopted it by decision in Osborn v. Arkansas 
Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 146 S.W. 122, 124 (Ark. 1912). North Dakota, in 1877, 
adopted the following statute: “The owner of land in fee has the right to the surface 
and to everything permanently situated beneath or above it.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 
47-01-12 (West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation). Professor Kuntz has 
observed in his treatise: “Ownership of land carries with it ownership of or the 
exclusive right to enjoy substances under the surface.” 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 59 (1987). 




Unless otherwise provided by law, the ownership of a tract of land 
carries with it the ownership of everything that is directly above 
or under it. 
The owner may make works on, above, or below the land as he 
pleases, and draw all the advantages that accrue from them, unless 
he is restrained by law or by rights of others.11 
The Louisiana Mineral Code applies this doctrine to “minerals occurring 
naturally in a solid state.”12 
This extension of surface boundaries to define subsurface rights 
operates on the same fence-line mentality used to define surface rights.13 
The problem, however, is that oil and gas can move within the reservoir 
rock structure and thereby migrate across the downward projection of 
surface boundary lines.14 This aspect of oil and gas prompted courts to 
develop the rule of capture. 
II. THE RULE OF CAPTURE 
In Louisiana, the rule of capture is found in article 8 of the Mineral 
Code that authorizes a landowner to “reduce to possession and ownership 
all of the minerals occurring naturally in a liquid or gaseous state that can 
be obtained by operations on or beneath his land even though his 
operations may cause their migration from beneath the land of another.”15 
That is the affirmative statement of the rule. Article 14 states the negative 
corollary of the rule: “A landowner has no right against another who 
causes drainage of liquid or gaseous minerals from beneath his property if 
the drainage results from drilling or mining operations on other lands.”16 
In each case, the “land,” “property,” or “other lands” will be measured by 
surface boundaries extended downward.  
                                                                                                             
 11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 490 (2015). 
 12. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:5 (emphasis added). 
 13. A description of this “fence-line mentality” follows: 
Although an owner of land can construct a fence, and delineate his or her 
surface boundaries, this is not possible when the line is drawn within an 
oil and gas reservoir. Yet, all oil and gas conveyances and leases draw 
lines that purport to neatly carve up the oil and gas reservoir. This is the 
product of one of the most basic rules of property law: the owner of land 
“owns” all that lies above and below the surface boundaries of the land. 
David E. Pierce, Oil and Gas Easements, 33 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 317, 319 
(2012). 
 14. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 210–11 
(La. 1922). 
 15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:8. 
 16. Id. § 31:14. 




Louisiana, like every other state confronting the issue, has struggled 
with applying ad coelum concepts to “fugitive minerals” that have the 
capacity to migrate across boundary lines within a reservoir.17 This 
characteristic explains why Mineral Code article 5 applies traditional ad 
coelum principles to “solid minerals”18 while article 6 states: “Ownership 
of land does not include ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals 
occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous form . . . .”19 Whether oil and gas 
rights are part of the “[o]wnership of land” or a right to enter land to 
explore, develop, and produce oil and gas does not matter.20 In either case 
the right to search for, extract, and own the oil, gas, or other minerals, is 
defined by what takes place on a tract of land that is described by surface 
boundaries.21 The court in Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil 
Syndicate described the role of boundaries under the non-ownership-in-
place theory noting that it granted the exclusive right to seek and capture 
oil and gas “that may be found within the exterior lines of his surface 
premises extended vertically downward.”22 
The ad coelum doctrine and rule of capture create what appear to be 
absolute and therefore seemingly conflicting property rights. To understand 
the full contours of oil and gas ownership, it is necessary to consider each 
reservoir owner’s correlative rights and rights created by conservation 
regulation.  
                                                                                                             
 17. This conceptual struggle apparently began in 1897 with the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s holding in Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897), 
where the court applied a rule of capture to gas migrating from adjacent lands 
owned by others. See TERENCE DAINTITH, FINDERS KEEPERS? HOW THE LAW 
OF CAPTURE SHAPED THE WORLD OIL INDUSTRY 28–29 (2010). 
 18. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:5. 
 19. Id. § 31:6. 
 20. The second sentence in article 6 provides: “The landowner has the 
exclusive right to explore and develop his property for the production of such 
minerals and to reduce them to possession and ownership.” Id. 
 21. The critical event where a mineral in the land becomes a separate item of 
property is when it is reduced to “possession” which occurs “when they are under 
physical control that permits delivery to another.” Id. § 31:7. The comment to 
article 7 notes the point of “possession” for oil and gas has been recognized as 
being when they are extracted at the wellhead. Id. cmt. The common law 
recognizes that oil and gas cannot be sold as “goods” until they have been 
extracted and are available for sale. U.C.C. § 2-107(1) (2012). The UCC article 
does not say that the oil and gas are not “goods.” It says that they cannot be sold 
as goods until there is severance by the seller; otherwise a contract is merely an 
agreement to sell. Id. 
 22. 76 P.2d 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938). 




III. CONSERVATION REGULATION AND CORRELATIVE RIGHTS 
Louisiana was quick to take action to respond to waste created by the 
rule of capture and the resulting damage to correlative rights. For example, 
when a gas well in Caddo Parish got out of control, caught fire, and burned 
for several months, the spectacle became a train destination for tourists 
from Shreveport, including the Governor of Louisiana.23 The well burned 
from May 7, 1905 through November 17, 1905.24 In 1906 the legislature 
promptly passed an act that criminalized allowing a gas well to remain out 
of control or wasting gas by allowing it to burn or vent into the air.25 In 
1960, Dean Sullivan, after studying the first 50 years of conservation 
experience in Louisiana, commented: 
Louisiana has a reputation for militant conservation of oil and gas. 
Problems that would be complex by the standards of many oil 
producing states have become routine. Judicial interpretation of 
the conservation laws and of administrative action thereunder 
reflects the appreciation of individual rights and of the necessity 
for the conservation of these irreplaceable natural resources.26 
As noted by Dean Sullivan, Louisiana has always been at the forefront of 
addressing difficult oil and gas ownership and development issues. 
Because conservation regulation often involves limitations on the rule 
of capture, “correlative rights” are often discussed in tandem with 
conservation issues. To a large extent, an owner is left to his or her own 
devices under the rule of capture to secure and protect correlative rights. 
As Professors Kramer and Martin note in their treatise on pooling and 
unitization: 
Having correlative rights in a common source of supply does not 
mean that each owner is guaranteed to recover a proportionate share 
of the oil or gas in the reservoir, but only that each owner shall be 
afforded the opportunity to produce or to share in production on a 
reasonable and fair basis. The point bears repeating for emphasis: 
                                                                                                             
 23. Yandell Boatner, Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in 
Louisiana, in LEGAL HISTORY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS 60, 61 n.3 
(1939). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 61. 
 26. CONSERVATION OF OIL & GAS 100 (Robert E. Sullivan ed., 1960). 




The correlative right is having the opportunity to produce, not having 
a guaranteed share of production.27 
When a conservation authority limits an owner’s self-help capture 
remedy—the “opportunity”—it must do so in a fair and equitable manner. 
A failure to do so would violate the owner’s correlative rights.  
A number of cases demonstrate how these correlative rights may be 
violated by limiting an owner’s opportunity to produce. For example, in 
Zinke & Trumbo, Ltd. v. State Corp. Commission of the State of Kansas,28 
the court held that the commission violated Zinke’s correlative rights by 
failing to consider a statutory factor in adopting a proration formula for 
gas wells in a reservoir, the “Morrow sand,” that the commission 
regulated.29 Sho-Bar completed a well with 11 feet of productive reservoir 
thickness located 330 feet from Zinke’s lease line.30 Zinke had completed 
a well on its lease with 30 feet of productive reservoir.31 Sho-Bar fraced 
its well; the court commented on the trajectory of the frac stating: 
Experts for both parties testified a fracture of this size would 
extend at least 400 feet in the area of least resistance. The center 
of the reservoir on Zinke’s lease is the area of least resistance. 
Since Sho–Bar’s location of Fincham 1–30 is only 330 feet from 
Zinke’s lease line, the fracture obviously penetrated Zinke’s 
lease.32 
After the frac treatment, production from Sho-Bar’s well increased by 
over 550%.33 This dramatic increase was attributed to the highly porous 
and permeable nature of the reservoir and the frac traveling from the edge 
of the formation, where Sho-Bar’s well was located, to the heart of the 
formation, where Zinke’s well was located.34 
When Sho-Bar applied to the Kansas Corporation Commission to 
establish field rules for the Morrow sand, Sho-Bar proposed 160-acre 
spacing with a 50–50 proration formula: 50% of the total pool allowable 
based upon the open flow of each well and 50% based upon the acreage 
attributable to each well.35 Zinke objected, arguing for 640-acre spacing 
                                                                                                             
 27. 1 BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING 
AND UNITIZATION § 5-01, at 5-16 (2014). 
 28. 749 P.2d 21 (Kan. 1988). 
 29. Id. at 28. 
 30. Id. at 23. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 27. 
 33. Id. (Flow increased from 4.5 million cubic feet per day to 25 million). 
 34. Id. at 23, 27. 
 35. Id. at 23–24. 




and a formula that was not so heavily weighted toward the open flow of 
Sho-Bar’s fraced well.36 The Commission adopted Sho-Bar’s 160-acre 
spacing and the 50–50 proration formula.37 
On appeal, the court first noted that the Commission had the duty to 
protect each party’s correlative rights, which include allowing each owner 
to produce from a reservoir in a manner that will not: “(A) injure the 
reservoir to the detriment of others; (B) take an undue proportion of the 
obtainable oil or gas; (C) or cause undue drainage between developed 
leases.”38 The applicable conservation statute required the Commission to 
“give equitable consideration to acreage, pressure, open flow, porosity, 
permeability and thickness of pay, and such other factors, conditions and 
circumstances as may exist in the common source of supply under 
consideration at the time, as may be pertinent.”39 Zinke contended the 
Commission erred by not considering the impact of the fracture treatment 
as an “other factor” in developing field rules for the Morrow formation. 
The court agreed and held that the order was unreasonable and a violation 
of Zinke’s correlative rights.40 
The Zinke case is an example of correlative rights in a public context 
designed to ensure fair treatment by government when it intervenes to 
marshal capture rights. The issue is routine and one that commissions, 
commissioners, and courts have dealt with extensively.41 Much less 
                                                                                                             
 36. Id. at 24. Zinke proposed an allowable formula determined by “dividing 
the net acre feet attributable to each well by the total reservoir acre feet.” Id. at 
26–27. 
 37. Id. at 24. 
 38. Id.; see also KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-101(a)(21)(A)–(C) (Supp. 
2014). 
 39. Zinke, 749 P.2d at 24 (emphasis added) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-
703(a) (1986)). 
 40. The court found: 
Under the KCC’s duty to protect correlative rights to natural gas in a 
common source of supply, we find evidence of fracture treatment to a 
well or wells in the common field to be one of the “other factors, 
conditions, and circumstances” which must be considered in making a 
proration order. It is particularly important where a well’s open flow is 
50% of its allowable production. The BPO [basic proration order] does 
not reveal, nor do we find, that the fracture treatment to Sho–Bar’s 
Fincham 1–30 well was considered by the KCC in making its BPO. We 
hold the order is thus unreasonable. 
Zinke, 749 P.2d at 28. 
 41. The Commission’s error in the Zinke case was not necessarily the ultimate 
formula it chose to adopt; it was the failure to consider the statutory factors in 
arriving at its decision. For example, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Gill, 194 So. 2d 351, 
353–54 (La. Ct. App. 1966), the Commissioner of Conservation adopted a 
participation formula in a reservoir-wide unit giving 60% weight to productive 




developed is the private context of correlative rights. The cases that follow 
are examples of courts resolving disputes that could have been better 
addressed using a correlative rights analysis. Instead, the issues were 
forced into an ill-fitting “property line” analysis. 
IV. INTRA-RESERVOIR CONFLICTS AND THE 
“PROPERTY LINE” ANALYSIS 
To date, conflicts among owners within an oil and gas reservoir have 
been framed using an ad coelom or rule of capture analysis, which is 
essentially a “property line” analysis. The most notable recent intra-
reservoir disputes have concerned hydraulic fracturing where frac fissures 
cross a subterranean boundary line. The Texas Supreme Court, in Coastal 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust,42 found no “actionable” trespass 
when a frac fissure extended into adjacent lands.43 The federal district 
court, applying West Virginia law in Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, 
LLC,44 considered and rejected the analysis in Garza and held that frac 
fissures extending into adjacent lands constituted an actionable trespass.45 
Commenting on the Texas Supreme Court’s analysis, the court in Stone 
stated: “The Garza opinion gives oil and gas operators a blank check to 
steal from the small landowner.”46 Both cases applied a property line 
analysis. 
                                                                                                             
sand under a tract; Mobil contended it should be a 100% weighting. In the Gill 
case, Mobil was complaining because the Commissioner considered other factors, 
authorized by statute, to determine “each producer’s just and equitable share.” Id. 
at 354 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court affirmed the Commissioner’s 
decision. Id. at 355. 
 42. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
 43. Although the Supreme Court found no actionable trespass, the trial court 
and court of appeals did, and the court of appeals affirmed damages of $543,776 
and punitive damages of $10,000,000. Mission Res., Inc. v. Garza Energy Trust, 
166 S.W.3d 301, 309–10 (Tex. App. 2005), rev’d sub nom., Coastal Oil & Gas 
Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex 2008). The court of appeals 
affirmed the jury finding of malice, concluding the record established “Coastal’s 
specific intent to cause substantial injury to appellees” by engaging in hydraulic 
fracturing to increase production from Coastal’s wells. Id. at 314–15. The court 
of appeals also found the Texas statutory cap on punitive damages was properly 
removed because the record supported a finding that Coastal’s hydraulic 
fracturing activities constituted felony theft. Id. at 315–16.  
 44. No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 2097397 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 10, 2013), 
vacated following settlement, 2013 WL 7863861 (N.D. W. Va. July 30, 2013). 
 45. Id. at *8. 
 46. Id. at *6. 




A. Garza: A Weak and Incorrect Analysis 
In Garza, the majority of the court held that addressing the inherent 
legitimacy of the frac fissure crossing boundary lines was unnecessary 
because the lessor, lacking a present possessory interest in the impacted 
land,47 could not seek damages for anything other than the loss of oil and 
gas through drainage.48 The court then made the analytical leap that any 
damages associated with drainage were foreclosed by the rule of capture.49 
The weakness of the analysis in Garza is that the court never evaluated 
the legitimacy of the activity that made capturing the oil and gas possible.50 
The predicate for being able to capture the oil and gas was the act of 
fracing the well. If the fracing was a legitimate act, then the drainage from 
the adjacent land would be protected by the rule of capture. If the fracing 
was illegitimate, the subsequent capture would also be illegitimate. 
Although Garza is hailed by many as “solving” the trespass problems 
relating to fracing,51 the court clearly indicated it was not addressing the 
issue.52 After noting its withdrawn opinion in Geo Viking, Inc v. Tex-Lee 
Operating Co.,53 where the court had held “fracing beneath another’s land 
was a trespass,” the court stated that it “need not decide the broader issue 
here.”54 Instead, the court held that any damages the plaintiffs could assert 
                                                                                                             
 47. Under Texas law, the oil and gas lease created a fee simple determinable 
conveyance of the oil and gas by the lessor to the lessee. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 9. 
Therefore, while the lease was in effect, the lessor owned a nonpossessory 
possibility of reverter in the oil and gas. Id. This limited the lessor to only those 
remedies available to owners of nonpossessory interests. Id. 
 48. Id. at 12. 
 49. See David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern 
Property Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 19 PENN ST. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 241, 260–61 (2011). 
 50. This was the principal complaint of the dissenting justices: “I would not 
address whether the rule of capture precludes damages when oil and gas is 
produced through hydraulic fractures that extend across lease lines until it is 
determined whether hydraulically fracturing across lease lines is a trespass.” 
Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 42 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices make 
the point that only legitimate capture is protected by the rule of capture. To 
determine whether Coastal’s capture was legitimate, the analysis must first 
address the legitimacy of the frac fissures crossing property lines. Id. at 43–44. 
 51. This general assumption is best demonstrated by the argument made by 
the defendants in Stone. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-
102, 2013 WL 2097397, at *4 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 10, 2013), vacated following 
settlement, 2013 WL 7863861 (N.D. W. Va. July 30, 2013).  
 52. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 12. 
 53. No. D-1678, 1992 WL 80263 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam), withdrawn, 839 
S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam). 
 54. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 12. 




were related solely to drainage, which the majority deemed to be 
encompassed by the rule of capture.55 
B. Stone: A Strong but Equally Incorrect Analysis 
The court in Stone uses a strict property line analysis to impose 
liability when a frac fissure crossed a surface boundary extended 
downward into the reservoir.56 The court did not attempt to consider the 
nature of each tract owner’s rights in the connected reservoir structure.57 
Correlative rights were not considered.58 
The problem with the analysis in Stone is the court assumed that when 
a frac fissure crossed a subterranean boundary line it constituted a 
trespass.59 Stone clearly answered the question left unanswered in Garza: 
recovery of oil and gas through a frac fissure that crosses property lines is 
a trespass and is therefore not protected by the rule of capture.60 The court 
stated its belief that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would 
find: “that hydraulic fracturing under the land of a neighboring property 
without that party’s consent is not protected by the ‘rule of capture,’ but 
rather constitutes an actionable trespass.”61 
The court noted that West Virginia fully embraces the ad coleum 
doctrine.62 The court used this reasoning to try and distinguish Garza 
because the Texas Supreme Court suggested the doctrine may not be 
applied to a subsurface trespass.63 The ad coelum doctrine is a necessary 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. “Accordingly, we hold that damages for drainage by hydraulic 
fracturing are precluded by the rule of capture.” Id. at 17. 
 56. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397, at *7–*8. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at *8. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. The Stone analysis, like the Garza analysis, fails to consider the 
connected nature of the property interest at issue. Neither opinion contains any 
analysis regarding the parties’ correlative rights in the reservoir. The observations 
made by Theresa Poindexter, in her student comment on Garza, are therefore 
equally applicable to Stone. Theresa D. Poindexter, Comment, Correlative Rights 
Doctrine, Not the Rule of Capture, Provides Correct Analysis for Resolving 
Hydraulic Fracturing Cases [Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008)], 48 WASHBURN L.J. 755, 756–57 (2009). 
 62. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397, at *7. The court observed: “Significantly, the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as recently as 2003 reaffirmed the 
maxim, stating that ‘we are considering the case of a lessor who owned from the 
heavens to the center of the earth.’” Id. 
 63. The Texas Supreme Court, after noting Lord Coke could not have 
envisioned airplanes or oil wells, stated: “The law of trespass need no more be the 
same two miles below the surface than two miles above.” Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 
11. This statement was dicta. The court was musing that if frac fissures constituted 




component of the property line analysis. Once a frac fissure crosses a 
property line, a trespass has been committed, and any drainage of oil and 
gas associated with the frac will be illegitimate and not protected by the 
rule of capture.64 
As is frequently the case, the court chose to protect the landowner’s 
right to refuse to pool its land or otherwise participate in development of 
the reservoir—the right to just say “no.” The Stone court emphatically 
made this point when it stated: 
The Garza opinion gives oil and gas operators a blank check to 
steal from the small landowner. Under such a rule, the companies 
may tell a small landowner that either they sign a lease on the 
company’s terms or the company will just hydraulicly [sic] 
fracture under the property and take the oil and gas without 
compensation. In the alternative, a company may just take the gas 
without even contacting a small landowner.65 
In many states, as in Louisiana, compulsory pooling statutes have 
severely limited the landowner’s ability to just say “no.”66 In a state like 
Kansas, which has no compulsory pooling, the landowner has the right to 
say “no,” but in that process, the landowner may also be saying no to the 
opportunity to recover the oil and gas beneath the land.67 
                                                                                                             
a trespass under the ad coelum doctrine, the court may be forced to consider, or 
reconsider, the nature of subsurface ownership. The court has subsequently 
indicated that different rules can be applied to subsurface invasions that do not 
relate to the recovery of oil and gas. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., 
L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306, 314 (Tex. 2011) (wastewater injection well). 
 64. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397, at *7–8. 
 65. Id. at *6. 
 66. In Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., the court held that:  
[W]hen the Commissioner of Conservation has declared that landowners 
share a common interest in a reservoir of natural resources beneath their 
adjacent tracts, such common interest does not permit one participant to 
rely on a concept of individual ownership to thwart the common right to 
the resource as well as the important state interest in developing its 
resources fully and efficiently.  
488 So. 2d 955, 964 (La. 1986) (emphasis added). 
 67. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. State Corp. Commission, 608 P.2d 1325 (Kan. 
1980), the court held that although the owner of an undivided 3/7 of the mineral 
interest refused to join in development, the remaining 4/7 interest may 
nevertheless be considered in assigning an allowable to a voluntarily pooled unit. 
Because the unit well was not located on the tract at issue, the owner of the 3/7 
interest would not participate in production attributable to the tract. In contrast to 
the “small landowner” situation described by the court in Stone, the Kansas 
Supreme Court viewed the “small landowner” and Mobil as follows: 




The court in Stone made clear that the rule of capture does not protect 
hydraulic fracturing.68 But whether fracing might be protected under a 
more precise definition of the parties’ respective rights as members of a 
“reservoir neighborhood” was an issue left untouched. 
V. THE RESERVOIR “NEIGHBORHOOD” ANALYSIS 
Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides, in part: “Although 
a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he cannot 
make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of 
enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him.”69 
This portion of article 667 recognizes that no property interest is absolute. 
Private property is sometimes made more valuable by recognizing limits 
on its free use because the property will benefit from similar limits 
imposed on surrounding owners. Even the ad coelum doctrine can be 
“restrained by law or by rights of others.”70 Carol Rose, one of the leading 
contemporary property theorists, has noted that property consists of “some 
individual rights, mixed with some rights shared with nearby associates or 
neighbors, mixed with still more rights shared with a larger community, 
all held in relatively stable but nevertheless changing and subtly 
renegotiated relationships.”71 One can apply Professor Rose’s theories to 
oil and gas development.72 When dealing with oil and gas in a reservoir, 
these reciprocal limitations—and corresponding reciprocal rights—are 
reflected in the concept of correlative rights. 
                                                                                                             
The rather dog-in-the-manger position of the owners of the 3/7 interest 
is that if Mobil won’t pay them a premium for joining the unit then it is 
unfair to let the owners of the 4/7 interest into the unit. The Commission, 
by its order, permits the 3/7 to use the 4/7 as a tool to improve their 
bargaining position. 
Id. at 1337. 
 68. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397, at *8.  
 69. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 667 (2015). Article 10 of the Mineral Code applies 
the Article 667 concepts to the oil and gas reservoir. See supra notes 1, 6. 
 70. LA. CIV. CODE art. 490. Article 490, after stating that “a tract of land 
carries with it the ownership of everything that is directly above or under it,” 
tempers this ownership by providing: “The owner may make works on, above, or 
below the land as he pleases, and draw all the advantages that accrue from them, 
unless he is restrained by law or by rights of others.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 
YALE L.J. 601, 631 (1998). 
 72. Pierce, supra note 49, at 245. 




A. Correlative Rights 
During the formative years of oil and gas law, the greatest threat to the 
rule of capture was the correlative rights doctrine. The concern was that 
the doctrine might be used to allocate a specific volume of oil and gas to 
individual tracts of land overlying the reservoir.  
1. Negative Rights and Fear of “Fair Share” Allocation 
In 1931, the American Petroleum Institute (“API”) sought to describe 
each owner’s correlative rights in a reservoir by stating: “‘each owner of 
the surface is entitled only to his equitable and ratable share of the 
recoverable oil and gas energy in the common pool in the proportion which 
the recoverable reserves underlying his land bear to the recoverable 
reserves in the pool.’”73 If this principle were applied literally, then a 
producer would have to stop producing once it had recovered its “equitable 
and ratable share of the recoverable oil and gas” from the reservoir. Any 
attempt to allocate a specific portion of a reservoir to overlying landowners 
would severely limit the rule of capture and the entrepreneurial spirit that 
rule inspires. Perhaps that is why the API, in 1942, purported to “clarify” 
its 1931 statement with the following: 
Within reasonable limits, each operator should have an opportunity 
equal to that afforded other operators to recover the equivalent of 
the amount of recoverable oil [and gas] underlying his property. 
The aim should be to prevent reasonably avoidable drainage of oil 
and gas across property lines that is not offset by counter 
drainage.74 
Through this clarification, the API fundamentally changed its statement 
on correlative rights by focusing on a fair “opportunity” to exercise capture 
                                                                                                             
 73. AM. INST. MINING & METALLURGICAL ENG’RS, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION 
256 (Stuart E. Buckley ed., 1951) (quoting AM. PETROLEUM INST., PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING § 1 (1930)); see also Seldon B. Graham, Jr., Fair 
Share or Fair Game? Great Principle, Good Technology—But Pitfalls in 
Practice, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 61, 65 (1975). 
 74. SPECIAL STUDY COMM. & LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON WELL 
SPACING & ALLOCATION OF PROD., AM. PETROLEUM INST., PROGRESS 
REPORT ON STANDARDS OF ALLOCATION OF OIL PRODUCTION WITHIN POOLS 
AND AMONG POOLS 8 (1942) (emphasis added); see also Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 
279 N.W.2d 564, 569–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 




rights as opposed to any attempt to allocate oil and gas to overlying 
property owners.75 
By the time this change in policy was announced, states were passing 
oil and gas conservation laws and the focus shifted from private correlative 
rights to ensuring equal treatment of owners by conservation agencies 
regulating drilling and production.76 The only private correlative rights 
issues were those dealing with injury to the reservoir that impaired the 
capture rights of other owners in the reservoir. Prior to the conservation 
movement, most correlative rights cases related to injury inflicted on other 
owners in the reservoir.77 One notable exception is Hague v. Wheeler,78 
which many commentators cite as an outright rejection of correlative 
rights in favor of unrestrained capture.79 As will be seen, however, Hague 
was probably the first “gas balancing” case, with the result driven by the 
court’s search for an equitable remedy. 
2. The First Gas Balancing Case: Hague v. Wheeler 
The court in Hague v. Wheeler was attempting to deal with one 
developer’s refusal to share a market for gas with another developer in the 
same reservoir.80 As the court noted: “it is a matter of first importance to 
get a clear apprehension of the facts . . . .”81 Wheeler undertook to drill the 
well “at the suggestion and request of the gas company . . . .”82 Hague was 
another operator in the field who was selling gas to the gas company.83 
After drilling a well, Wheeler and the gas company were unable to agree 
                                                                                                             
 75. This is also the modern definition of correlative rights. See KRAMER & 
MARTIN, supra note 27, § 5-01, at 5-16. 
 76. The API’s initial 1931 characterization of correlative rights was immediately 
followed by the enactment of state oil and gas conservation statutes. See generally 
THE OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION STATUTES [annotated] (Northcutt Ely comp. 
1933). 
 77. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209–10 (1900) (oil 
producer enjoined from producing in a manner that would injure gas producers in 
same reservoir). 
 78. 27 A. 714 (Pa. 1893). 
 79. DAINTITH, supra note 17, at 27–28 (“The court . . . explicitly rejected any 
restriction of the defendants’ rights derived from ideas of malice or correlative 
rights in a common resource, which had been adopted—from the developing law 
of subterranean waters—in a learned judgment by the court below.”); Bruce M. 
Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas Perspective, 
35 ENVTL. L. 899, 907 (2005) (describing Hague as a “‘pure’ form of the rule of 
capture”). 
 80. Hague, 27 A. at 718–19. 
 81. Id. at 718. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 




on a gas sales arrangement.84 In the meantime, Hague and the gas company 
were producing and marketing gas from their wells.85 Wheeler’s response 
was to open his well and let the gas vent into the air.86 After making several 
insightful observations about “correlative rights,” the trial court granted 
the injunction sought by Hague and the gas company.87 
The trial judge considered correlative rights limitations recognized 
under water law and commented on “certain duties of good neighborhood” 
that were applicable to the oil and gas reservoir.88 The court posed the 
following questions regarding the connected nature of the oil and gas 
reservoir: “What, then, are the rights of adjoining owners of oil and gas? 
Are they absolute and independent, or qualified and correlative?”89 
Answering the question, the court held that the “right of each owner is 
qualified” because of the connected nature of the right; each must “submit 
to such limitations as are inevitable to enable each to get his own.”90 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took a much more pragmatic 
approach to the issues. If the court upheld the injunction, there would be 
no incentive for Hague and the gas company to share their markets with 
Wheeler, and Wheeler’s gas would be drained away.91 If the injunction 
were denied, a chance would remain that Wheeler could make a deal to 
sell his gas, or his gas well, to Hague or the gas company. The issue was 
whether to uphold the trial court’s injunction. In reversing the injunction, 
the court did not think that accomplishing equity was necessary in this 
case.92 The court even ended its opinion with a statement acknowledging 
that an oil and gas developer “must not disregard his obligations to the 
public, he must not disregard his neighbor’s rights.”93 This ruling was not 
an outright rejection of correlative rights in oil and gas, but merely a 
                                                                                                             
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 717. In Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 82 So. 2d 206 
(La. 1919), leaving a well unplugged such that it impaired the ability of an 
adjacent landowner to efficiently operate their pump was held to be actionable. 
The court noted that one “must not in an unneighborly spirit do that which while 
of no benefit to himself causes damage to the neighbor.” Id. at 211; see also Mobil 
Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. Certain Underwriters Subscribing to Cover 
Note 95-3317(A), 837 So. 2d 11, 36–39 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (applying article 10 
of the Mineral Code to allow recovery of damages to the oil and gas reservoir 
neighborhood caused by negligent drilling operations resulting in a blowout). 
 88. Hague, 27 A. at 716. 
 89. Id. at 717. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 719 (“Their well must be shut in, while their successful neighbors 
drain the entire basin through their open wells, and receive pay for the gas.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 720. 




refusal to use the concept to limit Wheeler’s rights as to Hague and the gas 
company.94 
B. Professor Kuntz’s “Special Community” 
Professor Kuntz first described correlative rights as rules for a “special 
community” in a 1958 article for the Mississippi Law Journal.95 In 
summarizing the scope of the term “correlative rights,” Professor Kuntz 
observed: “It is a simple doctrine that owners of rights in a common source 
of supply may not inflict loss upon one another by conduct which is 
considered to be socially undesirable.”96 This statement concerns the 
negative rights component of correlative rights and declares what cannot 
be done in the reservoir. He then develops the “social” aspects of 
correlative rights, stating: 
The owners in the common source of supply operate in a special 
community, and the social acceptability of conduct within such 
community must be determined, not only by applying the standards 
applicable to conduct generally, but by also considering the utility 
of the conduct in the light of its peculiar consequence to others 
operating in the same community.97 
Although this passage suggests that Professor Kuntz would recognize a 
positive rights component to correlative rights, he does not further develop 
his special community observation. In his treatise, Professor Kuntz expands 
upon his analysis of correlative rights, mentioning “fracturing the sands” as 
being in a category where the rule of capture protects correlative rights by 
allowing impacted owners to “do likewise.”98 He contrasts that situation 
with secondary recovery operations “because it is not always possible for 
each operator to ‘go and do likewise’ and thereby obtain his fair share of the 
common source of supply.”99 The “reservoir community” analysis builds on 
Professor Kuntz’s special community but also provides a foundation for a 
positive rights component to correlative rights. 
                                                                                                             
 94. See id. at 718–20. 
 95. Eugene Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 MISS. L.J. 1, 8 
(1958). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. This “special community” analysis is also repeated by Professor Kuntz 
in his treatise. KUNTZ, supra note 10, at 120. 
 98. Id. at 129. 
 99. Id. 




C. A “Reservoir Community” Analysis  
The foundation of a reservoir community analysis is the physical 
reality that drawing a property line within a reservoir and thereby creating 
a segregated portion of reservoir ownership is not possible. This reality is 
also the inherent flaw with the ad coelum doctrine, the rule of capture, and 
the resulting property line analysis. What the courts failed to realize in 
Garza and Stone is the undeniable fact that neither party to the litigation 
had the sole rights to the reservoirs at issue. In each case, the parties owned 
more, and less, than the courts accounted for in their analyses. They each 
owned more rights because they also possessed rights in the reservoir at 
large, which gave them rights in the properties of their neighbors. They each 
owned less rights because the portions of the reservoir within their property 
lines were connected to surrounding properties. Because activities within 
the owner’s property lines could impact surrounding properties, the owner 
will be restrained to account for community rights. 
1. Define Community Membership 
The reservoir community analysis begins where the property line 
analysis begins and ends—with surface boundaries. The surface boundaries 
define membership in the reservoir community. Membership may change 
as more information concerning the extent of the reservoir becomes 
available. The extent of the reservoir defines the universe of potential 
members and ownership lines drawn at the surface will determine those 
members. 
Using the Garza case as a guide, assume the reservoir at issue—the 
community—is the Vicksburg T formation, which is found at a depth 
between 11,688 and 12,610 feet below the surface of lands that constitute 
the reservoir community.100 Although property lines will be used to define 
membership in a particular reservoir community, they will not define 
rights as a community member.101 
2. Define the Physical Attributes of the Reservoir Community 
The second step is to identify the physical attributes of the reservoir 
community. The Vicksburg T formation described in Garza is a gas 
                                                                                                             
 100. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex 
2008). 
 101. See David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of Hydraulic 
Fracturing, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 685, 693 (2011). 




reservoir located at the depths noted previously.102 “The Vicksburg T is a 
‘tight’ sandstone formation, relatively imporous and impermeable, from 
which natural gas cannot be commercially produced without hydraulic 
fracturing stimulation . . . .”103 Depending upon the conduct being evaluated, 
extensive geological and geophysical information may be collected for 
consideration. The goal is to figure out how the reservoir community 
works. 
3. Evaluate the Activity Impacting the Reservoir Community 
Once the mechanics of the reservoir community are fully understood, 
a developer’s proposed activity—and its impact on the reservoir 
community—can be properly evaluated. The activity for this example is 
the hydraulic fracturing conducted by Coastal in the Vicksburg T 
formation. The first issue is whether any hydraulic fracturing should be 
allowed in the Vicksburg T formation. Assume a landowner owning oil 
and gas rights in the Vicksburg T formation objects to all hydraulic 
fracturing. Perhaps they are concerned about frac fissures coming onto 
their part of the formation from adjacent lands. Perhaps they fear 
producing additional fossil fuels will contribute to climate change and the 
ultimate destruction of planet Earth. The matter will not be put to a vote. 
Instead, consideration of the physical attributes of the Vicksburg T 
formation will provide the answer. Because the Vicksburg T is worthless 
without hydraulic fracturing, it is an appropriate activity and one that 
should be encouraged.104 
But what if prudent development of the Vicksburg T formation 
requires that frac fissures extend across property lines?105 Can an owner 
object to the practice? Unlike the ad coelum capture property line analysis, 
the issue is not the proximity of a frac fissure to a property line. The issue 
is whether the conduct is in harmony with development of the reservoir 
community. The proper focus should be on the conduct: the justification 
                                                                                                             
 102. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 5. 
 103. Id. at 6. 
 104. The analysis should consider only what is necessary to maximize 
development and value from the Vicksburg T formation. Surface use and other 
collateral issues should not enter into the analysis. This is purely an exercise for 
the technicians seeking to get the most value out of an oil and gas reservoir. 
 105. This may be done to avoid creating bands of reservoir that are not 
appropriately developed and therefore leave oil and gas unrecovered and, in many 
cases, unrecoverable. Potential trespass liability would most likely cause these 
bands of otherwise productive reservoir to become wider as developers, and their 
lawyers, seek to manage the risk of trespass claims. This injects an artificial 
component into the development process that has no relationship to the best 
interests of the reservoir community, or the general public. 




for what was done, how it was done, and its impact on the reservoir 
community. The impact will be a matter of time and place; the state of the 
art combined with the special requirements of the reservoir.106 
This step is where the positive aspects of correlative rights play a major 
role in the analysis. When fracing is consistent with reservoir community 
standards, owners will have the affirmative right to send frac fissures across 
property lines and into adjacent lands. When properly viewed as a property 
right of a common owner in the reservoir community, trespass will not be 
an issue. The intrusion across property lines is authorized as a member of 
the reservoir community pursuing development of the reservoir. 
Therefore, when a court must evaluate the legitimacy of frac fissures 
that cross property lines, courts should not consider the concept of “trespass” 
until the property interests of all parties have been accurately defined. 
Trespass will always be dependent upon an accurate definition of the 
affected parties’ property rights. The reservoir community analysis 
recognizes communal rights in the reservoir that will often extend beyond 
property lines. The issue can also arise before a state oil and gas 
conservation commission, regarding spacing and set-backs from adjacent 
properties. The communal rights of all parties in the reservoir must likewise 
be acknowledged to prevent adopting development rules that create 
unnecessary buffer zones for no reason other than to accommodate property 
lines. Buffer zones can strand oil and gas reserves resulting in waste. 
Properly defining each owner’s property interest in the reservoir community 
will secure the rights of all owners and promote efficient development of the 
oil and gas resource. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether termed correlative rights, reservoir community, or 
subterranean neighborhood, the goal is to ensure that oil and gas ownership 
is viewed in its proper multi-dimensional context. Each owner within a 
reservoir is “connected” to varying degrees with other owners in the 
reservoir. This connection places restrictions on all owners to not do things 
                                                                                                             
 106. As noted in previous writings: 
The “time” element considers the state of the art in developing oil and 
gas. The “place” encompasses the unique conditions presented by a 
particular reservoir. . . . Development techniques and practices that were 
reasonable at one time may become unreasonable as they are eclipsed by 
new techniques and practices. Therefore, the correlative rights within a 
particular reservoir community must be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Pierce, supra note 49, at 259. 




in the reservoir that could injure the reservoir community. At the same time, 
that connection gives each owner affirmative rights that can extend into the 
community to such an extent that property lines may not be the limitation 
encountered at the surface. Hydraulic fracturing is a good example. Because 
developers must operate in an interconnected reservoir, allowing frac 
fissures to venture beyond property lines to achieve effective development 
of the reservoir community will often be reasonable. When the activity is 
appropriate to meet the needs of the reservoir community, fracing becomes 
one of the developer’s correlative rights. 
  
